The Gospel of Christian Atheism (1966), and other works like it, have had a profound impact upon theological studies, to the point that if one were to describe the theologies which arose in the 20th century one would inevitably have to mention the “death of God” theologians (the author Thomas J.J. Altizer; William Hamilton, Paul Van Buren, and Gabriel Vahanian). It was not only the Time Magazine article of 1965 which made “death of God” theology popular, nor the connections they make with Friedrich Nietzsche, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, and Paul Tillich, but the radically new way of understanding Christianity and Christian faith that made such a venture fashionable. Now in 2010 “death of God” theology has lost much of its initial steam and has lead the way for many contemporary understandings of faith that do not see God’s death as the sine qua non for doing theology: Religious naturalism could be said to have bridged the divide between a profane world and the sacred without ever needing a God to die; post-metaphysical theology retains some of the emphasis on the Word or logos but with a greater emphasis on the work of Martin Heidegger and Jacques Derrida; Process theology has the same emphasis on immanence and the kenosis of the Word; and constructive theology has accepted the rejection of “the increasingly archaic ecclesiastical tradition”[1] and understands that theology exists in and how we fashion it. Each of these contemporary forms of theology could be said to have already accepted much of the critiques of “death of God” theology (even unconsciously).
The “Radical Theology” of Bonhoeffer sought to bring Christian faith into direct engagement with the secular world, its culture, and its philosophy. Altizer, who was influenced by Bonhoeffer, went so far as to say “theology is now called to listen fully to the world, even if such a listening demands a turning away from the Church’s witness to Christ.”[2] This sacrifice is diametrically opposed to the “Christ Against Culture”[3] paradigm, which has been the dominant position in ecclesiastical Christianity throughout the ages. Yet the death of God theologians do not wish to give up on classic Christian symbols completely; they keep an emphasis on the Word, on faith, and on something they picture as a unique form of Christianity (although they think there is no “single essence”[4] of Christianity). It is almost as if they are testing the elasticity of Christianity by bringing it into an encounter with what the world has to offer.
For Altizer, what he calls the “atheistic prophets,” (Blake, Hegel, Marx, Dostoevsky, and Nietzsche) issued critiques upon a Christianity that “they knew to be opposed to the advent of the new man.”[5] They were “obsessed with Christianity” but found its theological formulas and ecclesiastical hierarchy appalling. Stripped of these chimeras Altizer thinks these prophets may have actually enjoyed the kernel of truth hidden underneath Christianity’s medievalism. Like Voltaire, they were not necessarily opposed to Christianity and Christian ideals, but to their historical and material manifestations. Just how compatible Nietzsche (or others like him) is with any form of Christianity is still up to debate, but Altizer sides with those who think they can be mutually complimentary.
For atheists who follow along the Nietzschean path, Altizer is committing a horrible fallacy. Saying Nietzsche may possibly be interpreted as a “radical Christian”[6] does grave injustice to his writings, ideas, and perspectives on religious belief. Whatever form of Christianity that thinks it is compatible with Nietzsche (i.e. radical theology) must completely trans-valuate their theology. Radical theology does not take the death of God as serious as Nietzsche, for even when it admits to God’s death, it still retains a hyper-deity in its notion of the Christian logos. If you really wanted to be a radical theologian (in my opinion), you should just be an atheist, plain and simple. There are good reasons why Nietzsche is considered an atheist and why those who have utilized his ideas argue for strict atheism (Walter Kaufman): it is because that is the most obvious and critical interpretation of his philosophy. To use Nietzsche as an arch-type of a “radical Christian” is like using Heidegger as a lens for doing onto-theology (Paul Tillich); the authors would be turning in their graves.
The picture of the radical Christian as the one who “seeks a total union with Jesus or the Word, and repudiates the God who is the sovereign Creator and the transcendent Lord”[7] is confusing to say the least, since many times in the New Testament Jesus speaks of his close connection with this “transcendent Lord.”[8] The radical Christian can respond to this by saying that they reject “both the literal and the historical interpretation of the Bible, demanding instead a pneumatic or spiritual understanding of the Word,”[9] but this “Word” could mean anything at all if we introduce an esoteric hermeneutic. How is Altizer able to claim so much about Jesus and the Word when he has no sources of theological authority?
Altizer’s project is an interesting one, and has been influential in liberal theological studies, but it has failed to reach the conservative Christian or the atheist. Of course we cannot expect something so impressive, but the barrier Altizer wished to break is still standing before us. Atheists and agnostics alike will inevitably find the “death of God” problematic, because it has a “God” who died. The atheist may say “well, at least he read Blake and Nietzsche” but “still I cannot mess around in esoteric battles over what the logos is.” Likewise, conservative religious persons will find the same problems. The foggy language, mystical emphasis, and the mixture with secular philosophy, does not bode well with the orthodox. The people who would find this project unproblematic are some liberal religious persons, mystically minded believers who enjoy Pseudo Dionysus, Meister Eckhart, and Nicholas of Cusa, and possibly readers looking for existential and novel forms of doing theology.
Atheism, as a worldview, not only denies that a God ever existed but it also provides reasons why a God is not needed for explanation, moral living, and finding meaning in life. In recent years what has come to be known as “religious naturalism” (Gordon Kaufman, Stuart Kaufmann, and Ursula Goodenough) seeks to show how meaning and purpose, a sense of wonder and awe, and morality, are an integral part of the natural world we inhabit. This “natural” understanding of religion offers reasons why the mystery of the cosmos is greater then the answer (i.e. God) assumed in traditional religion. To experience the world as mysterious is to abandon the idea that one needs a “comprehensive and total explanation” for life and existence. It is agnostic when it comes to supposed “ultimate” answers, and many think it should stay this way. There is simply no way to confirm, in my opinion, any claim of God’s revelation (in history, scripture, tradition, or experience); there are also good reasons to doubt any claims that act as if there is some indubitable foundation, Archimedean point, or sub specie aeterni, which to base your worldview on. Our finite human “situatedness” guarantees that our ideas remain expressions of subjective beings embedded in their natural environment.
The critiques of “death of God” theology do not only come from outside, there are also problems posed by insiders (theologians). For instance, apophatic or negative theology would critique Altizer’s notion that God died ontologically. This is because “being,” as a finite predicate, cannot be applied to an infinite being. Heidegger’s “ontological difference” shows that the being (what he calls “ontic”) of beings is different from Being (what Heidegger calls “ontological”) in itself. This difference is profound and should caution onto-theology from making assertions about God and being. If God were to exist, say these theologians, God would be beyond being. So to say that God had transcendent being before the crucifixion, and then God had immanent being, is to miss the fact that God cannot be described with finite predicates. There is no way we could know if what we understand as “being,” that is, as a finite predicate, is the same (univocal) “being” as God’s, or infinite “being.” The qualitative difference, if both kinds of being existed, would be beyond comprehension. It is better (according to these theologies) to avoid speaking about God altogether and remain in silence, wonder, and the acceptance of mystery, than to falsely attribute predicates to God. Whitehead would refer to this as “the fallacy of misplaced concreteness,” and many other philosophers have issued similar warnings.
With this in mind, I would much rather think of authentic theology as “agnostic theology.” This is because I think we cannot know whether or not God or spirits exist. Comparing theological models of ultimacy may then be likened to a philosophical or aesthetic attempt at organizing experience, and not as a cognition sourced in the knowledge of God’s revelation. Theologians have considered this way of doing theology, especially since Kant, and have offered up reasons for believing theology to be constructed by individuals and groups of religious communities. It is here where they begin to talk about the human imaginative factors (David Brown, Gordon Kaufman) in theology. As an atheist engaging with liberal theology, I applaud the new forms of theology emerging in the 21st century. To make people aware I would like to list these theologies:
- Religious Naturalism
- Post-liberal Theologies
- Apophatic (Negative) Theology
- Constructive Theology
- Death-of-God Theology
- Post-metaphysical Theology
- Radical Theology
- Religious Humanism
- Agnostic Theologies
[1] Thomas J.J. Altizer, The Gospel of Christian Atheism (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1966), 9
[2] Ibid, 10
[3] H. Richard Niebuhr, Christ and Culture (New York: Harper & Row, 1951)
[4] Altizer says “We must not imagine that there is a single essence of Christianity, or an inner core of unchanging faith, or a form of faith meaning all things to all men,” The Gospel of Christian Atheism, 18.
[5] Ibid, 20
[6] Ibid, 25
[7] Ibid, 25
[8] John 1:3, 10:30, Colossians 1:16, and others hint at the fact that Jesus’ followers may have thought of him as God himself.
[9] The Gospel of Christian Atheism, 25
and I would like to super applaud your entire last paragraph and list.
Thanks Kile for this very provocative post. There is much here to ponder. As a thoroughly Heideggerian, Derridean, apophatic theologian who is currently studying Dionysius and Eckhart and writing a dissertation on Nicholas of Cusa, your piece certainly strikes a few chords. I have not read Altizer, though, so I can’t say whether I’d find him “unproblematic” or not. As a Derridean, though, I suppose I find everything problematic. I’m not sure I understand why enjoying Dionysius, Eckhart, and Cusanus should earn one the label “liberal religious person.” True, Eckhart had his issues with authority (a more complicated story, though, given the specifics of the articles of reproach). But (Cardinal) Cusanus and Dionysius are rather orthodox, are they not? I also have some doubts about your articulation of Heidegger’s ontological difference. Your description seems to suggest an ontological equivocation, which is precisely Heidegger’s adversary in Sein und Zeit. Perhaps, though, I am misunderstanding you. I am in no way fit to defend Tillich, but also a bit surprised to hear his work labeled as ontotheology. (But I hesitate to even write that, since I hold only a rudimentary grasp of Tillich). Throughout the piece, though, I found myself wondering whom, precisely, you are arguing against? It feels as if you are arguing against someone, but I am either mistaken or have missed some key hint as to whom. Is it ontotheology writ large? Would that not be a reification?
Thanks for your comments Brad.
My point is that usually those who utilize the theology of Dionysus, Eckhart, and Cusa identify as liberal religious persons. Heidegger’s point is that being and Being are different. Ontic relates to the being of beings and Ontological relates to Being in itself. Tillich is blatantly doing ontotheology by equating or relating Being with God, or the Ground of Being. I am not arguing against anyone per se, I am simply hashing out how an atheist can understand and possibly relate to these theologies. I write in a manner of critique, and so I can see why you think I am arguing against someone. That is just my style.
Best,
How do you understand “Religious Humanism” Kile? I’m toying with reviving the term…
I understand religious humanism to be a fluid concept found throughout a multitude of religious and secular philosophies. It can be seen in liberal and post-liberal Christianity, which chooses to emphasize community, pluralism, social responsibility, ethical living, and the human factors at work in religious beliefs. Generally, anyone who considers herself a humanist, even a religious one, does not believe that revelation from God is necessary for moral living or meaning making. Unitarian Universalism is a another good example of religious humanism. Cultural Judaism may also be thought of as religious humanism, even though a majority of them consider themselves secular and have trouble believing in God. Some postmodern theologies may also be considered religious humanism. The forms of humanism I am more familiar with are Secular Humanism and the Ethical Culture movement.
really like this quote:
What I denounced, the “Christian atheists” now advocate , but only because they have in effect turned Sartre’s definition of man as a useless passion into a soteriological program, not realizing that if godless man no longer needs God to understand himself, neither – as Sartre and Camus show – does he need God to establish himself as his own contradiction (xi).
Must confess I have not read enough Sartre or Camus but this article reminded me of my desire to do so.